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Abstract. The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in law has again become of great
interest to lawyers and government. Legal Information Institutes (LIIs) have played
a significant role in the provision of legal information via the Web. The concept of
‘free access to law’ is not static, and its principles now require a LII response to the
renewed prominence of AI, possibly to include improving and expanding free ac-
cess to legal advice. This overview of one approach, from justification to implemen-
tation, considers the potential for AI-aided free legal advice, its likely providers,
and its importance to legal professionalism. The constraints that ‘free’ imposes lead
to the potential roles LIIs may realistically play, and suggested guidelines for de-
velopment of sustainable systems by free access providers. The AI-related services
and tools that the Australasian Legal Information Institute (AustLII) is providing
(the ‘DataLex’ platform) are outlined. Finally, ethical (or governance) issues LIIs
need to address are discussed.
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The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in law, including in relation to decision-
support systems, has again become a matter of great interest to both the legal profession
and to government. The previous wave of enthusiasm for, and investment in, ‘AI and law’
from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s was to a large extent supplanted by the develop-
ment of the World-Wide-Web and the provision of legal information via the Web. Legal
Information Institutes (LIIs) and the Free Access to Law Movement (FALM) played a
very significant role in those developments [1]. What roles might LIIs play in this new
AI-oriented environment?
The concept of ‘free access to law’ is not static, and has evolved over the past
quarter-century [2]. The principles of free access to law now require a LII response to the
renewed prominence of AI-related developments in law, which could include improving
and expanding free access to legal advice, as part of ‘free access to law’, consistent with
those of FALM’s Declaration of Free Access to Law1. ‘Freeing the law’ is a continuous
process.
This Chapter provides an overview of one approach to all aspects of this question,
from justification to implementation. We commence with a discussion of the potential
for provision of AI-aided free legal advice, its likely providers, and its importance to the
future of the legal profession. We then consider the constraints that the requirement of
‘free’ imposes, including on what types of free legal advice systems are sustainable, and
what roles LIIs may realistically play in the development of such a ‘commons of free
1http://www.falm.info/declaration/.
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legal advice’. We suggest guidelines for development of such systems. The AI-related
services and tools that the Australasian Legal Information Institute (AustLII) is providing
(the ‘DataLex’ platform) are outlined, including how they implement these guidelines.
Finally, we suggest questions concerning ethical (or governance) principles LIIs need to
address when they are involved in using AI tools.
1. The New Threats and Promises that AI Presents to Legal Advice
The ‘Web 2.0’ context since about 20042 creates a very different environment from the
pre-1995 (pre-Internet, in popular usage) context of the first wave of ‘AI and law’ This
context makes it more feasible to talk about the collaborative development of free legal
advice services based on AI. The reasons include the significant roles that FOSS (free
and open source software) and open content (exemplified by Creative Commons licens-
ing and Wikipedia) have had on the development of the Internet; the much greater so-
phistication of interfaces; and the differences that interaction between AI-based tools and
huge amounts of free access legal content can make.
1.1. The Trajectory of Digitisation of Legal Information Toward a Commons
We can distinguish three types of digitisation relevant to the giving of professional legal
advice: representation of information used by experts; representation of expertise and
its general application; and application of expertise to individual situations. These cate-
gories overlap in reality, these distinctions enable us to consider more precisely [3] how
likely is it that each category will be ‘liberated’ and become part of the commons (in
which we include availability for free access).
(I) Representing Expert Domain Information – ‘Raw’ (primary) information used by
experts is the most likely aspect of expertise both to be digitised and to become part of the
commons. Databases of primary information essential to legal professionals (legislation,
treaties, court decisions etc.) are already substantially digitised and available online, and
with increasing utility (e.g. smarter retrieval systems, and smarter data structures). In
many countries substantial amounts are available as commons, at least for free access
and often as open content, usually via government sources. In a few dozen countries
such as Australia, free access ‘legal information institutes’ (LIIs) aggregate this data and
add value to it, making it a resource used by professionals and the general public alike.
Even there, some primary information is only available commercially, include standards,
‘authorised’ reports (monopolistic practices arising from privileged citation practices),
and important ‘pre-LII’) historical data. However, in less than 25 years since the start
of widespread availability of such data via the Web, the increase in free availability is
extraordinary, and is tending toward a comprehensive commons.
(II) Representing expertise in general form – When professional expertise is repre-
sented (or embodied or reified) this is usually in a generalised form which may or may
not be applicable to an individual situation where expertise is needed, because of the
enormous variation of individual situations which may arise. It is up to the reader (usu-
2The term ‘Web 2.0’ was popularised from around 2004, generally taken to include web services catering
for user-generated content (including all social media, blogs, Twitter etc.), and many software enhancements
allowing much more responsive interfaces than plain HTML.
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ally the correct term) to apply the expertise to the individual situation. Legal profession-
als represented their expertise in many ways prior to the Internet – in textbooks, journal
articles, encyclopedias, and in very significant, but more mundane, forms such as citators
and checklists (often as supervisors of non-professionals).
In the pre-Internet era, compilations of expertise may have been collective (e.g.
commissioned encyclopedia articles, or Halsbury’s Laws), but were very rarely ‘crowd
sourced’. The economics of publishing meant that such reification of expertise could
rarely be provided as a commons, and instead it usually became an economic asset of a
commercial publisher and an author. The Internet changes some but not all of these fac-
tors. Expertise is a very valuable asset of many professionals. It is very time-consuming
to consciously embody it in any form, and many professionals are very reluctant to ‘give
it away’, either because they believe it gives them a competitive advantage, or because
they would prefer to be paid by a publisher, or because publishing expertise is time-
consuming, difficult and potentially risky. Commercial publishers of such expertise will
not disappear. Commons must always coexist with commerce.
However, the last quarter century has brought many changes, the revolutionary po-
tential of which are only becoming apparent through the accretion of successes, includ-
ing free access repositories of current scholarship, archives of published journals, and
changing academic funding requirements. The crowd-sourced Wikipedia demonstrates
that under certain circumstances (including viral licensing), the expert and non-expert
public can combine to create the largest, free, and probably by now most reliable ency-
clopedia. However a ‘closed wiki’ model, where content may only be edited by profes-
sionals may be more suitable for law, because of its emphasis on authority. Successful
commons examples exist including multi-author guidebooks [4], and automated citators
performing to professional levels [5]. The result is that the combination of factors such
as these – peer-reviewed free content; funding body pressure; viral licensing; crowd-
sourcing; collaborative editing by closed professional groups; and automated substitu-
tions for expertise – and many others, may threaten the viability of some types of com-
mercial control of the publishing of expertise. More importantly, they demonstrate that it
is becoming viable for professionals to control the representation of their own expertise,
as a commons.
(III) Applying Expertise to Individual Situations – It is the third category, the appli-
cation of expertise to individual situations (the problems of individual clients) via pro-
grams, which is seen widely as a major threat to the future of professionals and pro-
fessions [4]. At present, the number of convincing examples and their commercial vi-
ability do not make it inevitable that there will be generalised dire results for profes-
sions. To understand the likely implications, it is necessary to distinguish at least three
types of the programmatic applications of legal expertise: human expertise embodied in
knowledge-bases which interact with programs; embedded knowledge in artifacts; and
machine-generated expertise. The first is most relevant to free legal advice providers.
The question is whether, in those areas where legal expertise can be effectively captured
in knowledge-bases to be used in decision-support systems, can they be developed as a
commons, or only as commercial products? The following sections explore this further.
1.2. AI and Threats to Legal Professionalism
It is somewhat ironic that one of the arguments favouring the development of a com-
mons of legal expertise is the threat that the application of AI to law poses to the legal
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profession and individual legal professionalism. The extent of the threat (also presented
as a promise of efficiency) is still very difficult to estimate, though often claimed to be
extreme. The threat has three main sources. Where there is a substantial market for so-
lutions to a category of legal problem, expert advisory systems can economically auto-
mate answering problems up to a certain level of complexity. Beyond that, knowledge
acquisition and other bottlenecks make their applicability unproven. Embedded knowl-
edge delivered through software will continue to permeate the material world and to im-
pose ‘normal’ behaviour which adheres to medical, accounting or legal norms (including
some ‘smart contracts’). Machine-generated expertise will be relied upon increasingly
in relation to the set of problems where prediction of a ‘correct’ answer is sufficient (by
whatever path it is reached), and explanations in terms of underlying causes and human
reasoning are not required ([4], 2.3).
If we assume that these nascent developments will accelerate, what are the impli-
cations for legal professionals? Instead of a relatively prestigious and well-paid class
of ‘para-professionals’, who support the delivery of semi-automated packaged commer-
cial services, there may instead develop an intermediate category of what we could
call ‘pseudo-lawyers’, who have the training, the formal status, and the self-image of a
lawyer, but are really closer to a low-paid paralegal doing repetitive work involving mod-
erate levels of expertise. This will usually involve driving and interpreting computerised
products developed by those with more expertise. Another set of possibilities (various
‘Uber models’) involves teams of individual legal providers put together on an ad hoc
basis by intermediaries (‘platform providers’), likely to involve the platform provider
taking a major share of the funds paid for provision of services.
In any of these future scenarios for individual lawyers, who will own the intellectual
property in the software and applications used in these types of provisions of services?
It is unlikely to be the employed ‘pseudo-lawyers’ or the service provider in an ‘Uber
model’: the large firm employer, or the provider of the platform will be likely to develop
such expensive tools themselves, or will have the necessary very significant funds to buy
them (and keep them updated) from a large commercial legal publisher. The employed
solicitor, the small practitioner or the barrister in chambers, except those at the higher
levels of the profession, will not be able to afford the modern equivalents of legal pro-
fessional tools. We argue that protecting their professionalism may also help to produce
free legal advice services.
2. An Alternative Future: A Commons of Legal Expertise
Although there is as yet no obvious tendency toward commons in relation to the three
categories of software-based application of expertise to individual cases, we argue that
this can be encouraged to develop. Tools for knowledge engineering and for creating
machine-generated expertise are available as FOSS and are of high quality, but the com-
munities of users necessary to develop applications (similar to the FOSS or Wikipedia
communities) have not yet developed. The employed solicitor, small practitioner or bar-
rister is unlikely to contribute spontaneously to the development of commons. But the
risk for such professionals in not having any role in the development of AI tools in law
is that they will lose control of their standing, abilities and future as professionals, to a
far greater extent than in the pre-AI structures of the legal profession.
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The alternative is that there be at least some part of the development and use of AI in
law that is open to participation by any lawyers, and which collectively may provide a set
of AI-based applications that are an alternative to those controlled by mega-firms in law
and consultancy, and the oligopoly of large publishers. For sole practitioners and small
firms, some such collaboration many be the only strategy possible for them to participate.
From where could such a collaborative alternative arise? We argue that it could arise
primarily from those organisations that seek to provide free legal advice, and be driven
largely by their needs, but could expand to involve other participants in the legal profes-
sion.
2.1. The Providers and Constraints of Free Legal Advice
There are many situations where, at least in a country like Australia, our social expec-
tation is that legal advice be provided without cost to the public, whether as consumers,
citizens or (sometimes) litigants. The organisations most likely to be involved in provid-
ing such free legal advice are quite diverse, and include government legal aid providers,
community legal centres, government and community consumer advice centres, special-
ist NGOs in law-related areas, government agencies giving advice relevant to their func-
tions, and ‘chamber magistrates’ in courthouses. The legal profession, through state and
regional Law Societies and advice centres they provide, and through the extensive pro
bono schemes, also contributes. University law schools, through their involvement in
community legal centres and internships in other organisations, are potential sources of
contributors who often have high computing skills. Bodies assisting the legal profession
as a whole to avoid liability problems, such as some legal insurers, might also wish to
participate.
A common factor in most of these providers of free legal advice is that, if they
choose to develop AI-related tools to assist their work, they will usually have to do so
within very constrained development and maintenance budgets for software or applica-
tions. They are not in a position to pass on such costs to clients, or to purchasers of appli-
cations. Government or other grants for such developments may provide up-front devel-
opment costs (at least while the hype cycle for AI is rising) but will rarely cover ongoing
maintenance for applications as the law changes, or technical issues arise. Bringing in
out-of-house consultants on specialised software problems, or as ‘knowledge engineers’
in relation to particular legal domains, is likely to be very expensive. It is therefore a
reasonable assumption that, at least in the medium to long term, providers of free legal
advice will have to work within significant financial constraints that are more severe than
those experienced by commercial providers.
The implications of these constraints – limited institutional range of providers, and
limited financial resources – affect the types of legal advisory systems that it is practical
for this sector to develop and support.
2.2. Free Legal Advisory Systems: Guidelines for Sustainability
We have previously set out and justified our views on what approach to the use of AI
tools is most likely to be of value to a free legal advice service ([6], 3.1-3.16). These
guidelines are based on the assumptions discussed above of the likely limited financial
and personnel resources of such a service, and on our own lengthy experience with the
DataLex project. They are implemented in the DataLex platform discussed in Section 3.
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First, the ‘AI and law’ systems that such a service could be expected to find useful
are those that justify their answers at least in part in terms of the formal sources of law.
These constraints will mean that only some types of ‘AI and law’ tools are suitable to
their needs.
Second, looked at from the user perspective, which could be that of an employee of
a free legal advice service, or perhaps one of its clients, what counts as a useful level of
legal expertise is relative. A system may be valuable to a class of users even though it
has a relatively low point at which it admits that a problem is beyond its expertise, and
it may serve as a method of triage. In any event, it is not realistic to try to build legal
expert systems that encapsulate all the knowledge necessary to answer user problems.
The more realistic aim is to build decision support systems, in the use of which the pro-
gram and the user in effect pool their knowledge/expertise to resolve a problem. Exper-
tise can and should be represented and utilised by programs in many ways. This means
the knowledge-based system (the knowledge representation and the program) should not
be ‘closed’: it must be integrated with text retrieval, hypertext and other tools which al-
low and assist the user to obtain access to whatever source materials are necessary to an-
swer the parts of a problem dependent on the user’s expertise. The result is an integrated
decision-support system.
Third, looked at from the developer perspective, the key contextual factor is that
user-organisations such as free legal advice services, will probably need to both develop
and maintain their own knowledge-bases, as the only available domain experts. The sys-
tems which non-technical legal domain experts are most likely to be able to develop and
maintain are those which represent legal knowledge in a way which has a reasonably
high level of isomorphism (one-to-one correspondence) with the legal sources on which
it is based, where the representation is reasonably close to natural language, and where
it is not necessary to prescribe the order(s) of the procedural steps necessary to reach a
solution to a problem, but only to declare what legal knowledge is available, and leave it
to the system to undertake the steps to apply that knowledge.
Fourth, correctly choosing the type of problem where ‘AI and law’ techniques are
most likely to be appropriate is essential. Problem areas based on legislation, or proce-
dural steps, and where there is complexity, will probably give the best results. Problems
involving multiple instances of one factor increase logical difficulty. If it is administra-
tively possible to have multiple organisations collaborate to build and maintain a legal
knowledge-base, this may increase sustainability.
Is the approach sketched under these four headings out-of-step with current ap-
proaches to the use of AI in legal applications? Ashley, a leading current proponent of
the field of AI and law, might well regard our ambitions for system development as un-
necessarily modest (or perhaps just the product of our constraining assumptions), but
there is little that is inconsistent between this ‘legal decision support system’ approach
taken by the DataLex Project and its underlying rationales, and the ‘cognitive computing’
paradigm he advances [7].
2.3. The Likely Roles of LIIs
Fifth, we conclude that free access legal information institutes (LIIs) are unlikely to be
the builders of legal knowledge-bases in particular legal domains, because they do not
have the necessary in-house expertise in legal subject domains. They have neither the
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client-base that provides a continuing need for such expertise, nor the funds to retain such
expertise from outside (at least not on a continuing basis, beyond an initial grant). As a
result, LIIs are much more likely to be the providers of tools by which such knowledge-
bases are built, the free access legal infrastructure within which they are built, and edu-
cation and support for those organisations that use their tools and services to build and
maintain subject-area applications. In light of that conclusion, we now move to the tools
and services that AustLII is building.
3. AI in a LII: AustLII’s DataLex Implementation
The Australasian Legal Information Institute (AustLII), through its DataLex project [6];
[8] is developing tools and infrastructure so as to implement the above ‘sustainable legal
advisory systems’ approach to AI and law in the context of a LII. This platform includes
five main elements, rectangles in the following diagram. The features of each are then
summarised (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Elements of AustLII’s DataLex legal inferencing platform
3.1. The DataLex Inferencing Software
The DataLex inferencing software3 primarily carries out rule-based reasoning. It has the
following key features:
• Support for backward-chaining and forward-chaining rule-based reasoning. Rules
are expressed in a declarative form.
• Rule-based reasoning is supplemented by procedural code, where procedural steps
in reasoning are needed.
3The DataLex inferencing software was originally written by Andrew Mowbray, as y-sh (‘y-shell’), with
subsequent further layers by various authors including Simon Cant and Philip Chung, to enable web-based
operation.
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• Rule based reasoning is also supplemented by example-based (or ‘case-based’)
reasoning4, where needed.
• Rules of any degree of complexity may be written, using propositional logic.
• A quasi-natural-language knowledge-base syntax (ie one resembling English as
far as is possible) is used to declare rules (and examples).
• There is no separate coding of questions, explanations and reports, because they
are all generated automatically from the declared rules, in dialogues generated ‘on
the fly’ when the system is in operation. This default operation can be customised
where special circumstances require.
• Isomorphic (one-to-one) relationships between the knowledge-base and legislation
is facilitated, and assists in debugging and updating.
• The previous three elements allow easier development, de-bugging and mainte-
nance by domain experts (lawyers), without involvement by software experts or
‘knowledge engineers’.
• Collaborative development of larger applications across distributed knowledge-
bases is supported.
An extract from the ElectKB knowledge-base [10] is shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2. Extract from the ElectKB knowledge-base
3.2. The AustLII Communities Environment – Integrating AI with a LII
The AustLII Communities environment is used to link automatically both knowledge-
bases under development, and advisory systems when in operation, with all of the free ac-
cess legal materials provided by a LII. The hypertext links in the above know-ledge-base
extract are inserted automatically, using AustLII’s findacts software, into the knowledge-
base as it is written and saved. Further examples of links from applications in operation
are given below.
3.3. The DataLex Knowledge-base Development Tools
The DataLex development tools [11] are situated within the AustLII Communities in-
frastructure. They use a familiar wiki-like editing interface for development and mainte-
nance of knowledge-bases (KBs). Development is within a closed wiki environment.
4PANNDA (Precedent Analysis by Nearest-Neighbour Discriminant Analysis); see [9] for details about the
FINDER (finders’ cases) application of PANNDA.
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3.4. The DataLex User Interface
The DataLex user interface uses the DataLex software and knowledge-bases, the linkages
provided by the Communities environment, and user input, to provide legal advisory
systems in operation. From Figure 3 the following screen, it can be seen that some of the
features of the interface include:
• Questions, Facts, Conclusions, and Reports are all generated from the knowledge-
base and user-provided facts, in understandable form, and are available on screen
at all times.
• Facts can be deleted (‘Forget?’), and questions than re-asked; Conclusions can be
explained (‘How?’); and reasons for Questions requested (‘Why?’), generated in
the same manner.
• The system also uses all information available to it, from the knowledge-base and
user-supplied facts, to suggest other relevant Related Materials.
Figure 3. DataLex user interface features: ‘Consultation’, ‘Facts‘, ‘Conclusions’, ‘Related Materials’
As the consultation continues, conclusions are shown on the right-hand side. Selec-
tion of a numbered conclusion results in a ‘How’ explanation of that conclusion being
presented (Figure 4).
At the end of the consultation, a composite explanation of the final result, and of
all the steps necessary for it to be reached, is displayed and may be exported to word
processing or other programs for use.
3.5. The LawCite Citator and SINO Search Engine – Updating and Expanding Advice
SINO is the open source search engine, developed by AustLII [12], used to operate
AustLII and other LIIs. The LawCite citator [6] is an automated international citator for
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Figure 4. DataLex ‘How’ explanation of a conclusion during consultation
case law and legal scholarship, accessible to end-users free of any user charges. It is
developed and maintained by AustLII in conjunction with a consortium of participating
legal information institutes (LIIs). LawCite currently contains index records of the cita-
tion histories of almost 5.7 million cases, law journal articles, law reform documents and
treaties, going back to the 1300s. It includes citation records in significant numbers from
court decisions in 75 countries. It is integrated fully into the operations of AustLII and
other LIIs that use it. The technical details of LawCite are explained elsewhere [13].
The significance of both LawCite and SINO within the DataLex project is that they
provide a means of (in effect) expanding the scope of a knowledge-base by providing
users with access to knowledge which is not yet encoded within the knowledge-base.
Examples are as follows, from the ElectKB knowledge-base [10] concerning disqualifi-
cation for eligibility for election to the Australian federal Parliament:
1. Wherever the term ‘foreign power’ appears in a consultation dialogue, it does so as
a hypertext link (Figure 5) which triggers a search over AustLII for all occurrences
of ‘foreign power’ in the context of s. 44 of the Australian Constitution. The user is
then given a list of cases, journal article etc., ranked in default by likely order of rel-
evance, to enable them to determine the correct answer to the question (Figure 6).
2. Wherever a citation for a case appears in a dialogue, it will be linked automatically
to the text of the case (where it is a neutral citation), with a further link to the
LawCite record, as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 5. Embedded search link on the words ‘foreign power’
The user is able to note from the LawCite citation record whether that case has been
considered by other cases subsequent to the knowledge-base being written, and to check
for any resulting changes to the law. No knowledge-base can be updated as frequently as
the law might change, and this is particularly so when they are subject to the constraints
discussed in Section 2. For example, the LawCite record for this case alerts the user to
recent cases considering Sykes v Cleary, that may not yet be taken account of in the
knowledge-base (Figure 8).
It should be clear from these examples that updating a legal knowledge-base through
links and searches requires access to the case and legislation content of a whole legal
system, updated continuously. For providers of free legal advice, the most feasible source
of such information is a free access Legal Information Institute (LII).
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Figure 6. Search results from embedded search link
Figure 7. Automated hypertext links to case law references
Figure 8. LawCite records for Sykes v Cleary
4. Ethical and Governance Issues in Free Legal Expertise Systems
In the previous sections we have informally referred to ‘legal advisory systems’ for pur-
poses of readability, but in this Section we need to distinguish between systems which
aid interpretation, give advice, and make decisions, so we will used the expression ‘le-
gal expertise systems’ to encompass all three uses, because each of them involves the
embodiment and use of expertise.
‘Free legal expertise systems’ are systems which are able to be used for consultation
purposes at no cost (including with no required disclosure of personal data) by any per-
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son, or which are able to be used by legal advisors working for free legal advice providers
in order to advise their clients.
Such ‘free’ systems include, but are broader than, fully ‘open’ legal advisory sys-
tems, which refer to those systems which are not only free to use, but for which both
the knowledge-base, and the software required to operate it, are open to anyone to copy,
modify and re-use. Between the minimum condition of ‘free use’ and fully open legal
advisory systems there are many intermediate points, all of which we regard as consistent
with ‘free and open legal advisory systems’.
Multiple parties may be involved in providing such systems, including pro bono
knowledge-base developers (from law firms or academia), intermediaries such as a LII,
and free advice providers such as community legal centres (CLCs) or others. In our view,
these parties need to consider at least the following issues, and to adopt Principles for
the ethical development and governance of such systems. These issues apply specifically
to the context of free consultation and free advice, rather than the more general commer-
cial context in which AI is employed in law. Principles adopted should, in our view, be
consistent with the principles of free access to legal information.
Here, we are only identifying issues which need to be addressed. In a subsequent
paper we will propose the principles which should be adopted to address these issues.
(i) Legal expertise systems to aid interpretation, to give advice, and to make decisions
must be distinguished. Such distinctions will determine whether warnings must be
given that they do not provide legal advice, or who is responsible for any legal
advice provided, or the consequences of decisions being made as a result of their
use.
(ii) Legal expertise needs to be based transparently on sources of law, whereas this
may not be necessary for other uses of AI in relation to law.
(iii) Legal knowledge-bases may need to have transparent attribution of authors and
publishers, and of the date of the law they claim to represent. The role of anony-
mous authorship is very questionable in relation to legal expertise systems.
(iv) Legal knowledge-bases may need to be transparent, and its text available for free
access whenever the system is used.
(v) The logic and assumptions of legal expertise systems implementations may need
to be transparent, not only the text of the knowledge-base.
(vi) What is needed to ensure that systems claiming to provide free expertise do not
charge end users, directly or indirectly?
(vii) Should end-users of legal expertise systems always be able to remain anonymous
to the systems in use?
(viii) How can legal knowledge-bases be licensed appropriately for the effective and
expanding provision of free legal expertise?
(ix) How can software for legal expertise systems be licensed appropriately so as to
expand provision of free legal expertise?
(x) Legal expertise systems will need to observe emerging principles of ethical use of
AI, which are becoming numerous [14]; [15]; [16]; [17].
5. Conclusions – When Is AI Feasible for Free Legal Advice Providers?
In this Chapter we have identified why providers of free legal advice are likely to face
significant constraints on the resources available to them to develop and maintain AI-
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based legal advisory systems, and the implications this has for the types of systems they
are most likely to use.
We have set out the approach that AustLII, through its DataLex platform, is taking
to facilitate the development of such systems, and how the DataLex approach allows
implementation of the guidelines for sustainable legal AI that we have proposed. We
suggest that similar approaches could be worth considering by other LIIs.
We have identified ten questions about ethical/governance issues which require con-
sideration by those who wish to develop legal expertise systems for the purposes of free
legal interpretation assistance and free legal advice provision. These guidelines and Prin-
ciples will enable development which is sustainable by the organisations likely to be
providing such advice, and to which will contribute to an expanding commons of legal
expertise embodied in AI-based tools.
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